



# Security Challenges for Cooperative and Interconnected Mobility Systems


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## Context: Trends

**Automotive innovation in software**  
(estimate is that this will be 80%\*)


- More microprocessors and sensors in the vehicle

**Increased connectivity**


- Telematics systems by Kia, Daimler and BMW
  - Integrate map-based, vehicle diagnostics, and e-call (mandatory as of 2015)
- Interfaces: internet or ad hoc networks
- Interconnected in-vehicle systems



UVO eServices – KIA





MBACE2 – Daimler



BMW ConnectedDrive – BMW

\* R.N. Charette, "This car runs on code", IEEE spectrum, Feb. 2009






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## Context: Cooperative and Interconnected mobility systems

› Cooperative Driving results in\*:


- › Less traffic congestion
- › Less traffic accidents
- › Less CO<sub>2</sub> emission




**mobility:** cooperative driving



**safety:** collision warning → mitigation → avoidance






**comfort:** cruise control, advanced cruise control, speed advice



**safety:** e-call system

\*TNO report 2008-D-R0996/A: "Smarter and better – the benefits of intelligent traffic"







## Context: Problem statement

Current solutions are insecure, a few examples



- Risks for wireless interfaces\*
- Risks for in-vehicle systems\*\*
- Risks for cooperative mobility systems\*\*\*
- Other threats are coupled nomadic devices




Cooperative mobility systems require security solutions  
**Absence of security can be a show stopper!**


- Information applications with an underlying payment model require secure functioning
- Safety/warning systems require secure and trusted sensor values and communicated information

\*S. Checkoway et al. "Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces", Proceedings of USENIX Security, 2011  
\*\* F. Kargl et al. "Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges", IEEE Communications, 2008  
\*\*\* T. Jeske, "Floating Car Data from Smartphones: What Google and Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic", Black Hat, 2013









## Attack incentives



Incentives	Share for PCs and phones	Likelihood for cooperative systems	Speculated impact on cooperative systems
Profit: premium services	+40%	Serious	Medium
Profit: information theft	+28%	Serious	Small
Profit: vehicle theft	None	Probable	Medium
Destruction or novelty and amusement	+33%	Probable	Large
Profit: ransom & click fraud	< 5%	Minor	Medium
Eavesdropping and espionage	Unknown	Minor	Small





## Mobile internet communication



**Problems and solutions**


- Always-on data-connections added to vehicles
- Update software
- Real-time routing information
- Web browsing
- Remote vehicle control

**Security risk factors**

- An internet uplink opens up previously closed systems
- Safety critical system becomes vulnerable
- Potential to harm national security
- Long life cycle poses a challenge that is unrivalled by IT devices




## Vehicular Ad Hoc Networking



**Problems and solutions**


- Rapidly changing topology and unorganized nature
- ETSI performed a vulnerability and risk factor analysis in 2010
  - Counter measures and improvements formulated
- Certificate based communication are proposed

**Security risk factors**

- Data integrity
- Insecure positioning
- Response latency






## In-Vehicle Systems

**Problems and solutions**

- Hardware encryption modules
- Firewalls
- Software upgradeable
- Coupling with nomadic systems

**Security risks**

- Secure by design
  - Ductile
  - Graceful degradation
- Coupling of nomadic devices
- Lack of risk factor analysis








## Discussion


**Dilemmas**

- Data protection vs. information sharing
- Private sector vs. public sector
- Stimulate the economy vs. improve the security

**Organizational challenges**

- Education in cyber hygiene for maintenance
- OEMs should prepare for massive recalls
- Change of vehicle safety laws
- Backward compatibility between algorithms
- Log behaviour for accountability
- Licence revocation might be needed





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## Conclusions

Security for interconnected and cooperative mobility systems will become important in the coming year

- Crucial for acceptance and successful introduction of cooperative mobility systems
- Most serious incentive is profit
- Biggest threat is destruction and novelty
- Biggest security risk factors
  - Application data integrity validation
  - Insecure positioning
  - Systems are currently not secure by design
- Dilemmas and organizational challenges should be addressed



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## Questions?

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