



Security Challenges for Cooperative and Interconnected Mobility Systems

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Context: Trends

Automotive innovation in software
(estimate is that this will be 80%*)

- More microprocessors and sensors in the vehicle

Increased connectivity

- Telematics systems by Kia, Daimler and BMW
 - Integrate map-based, vehicle diagnostics, and e-call (mandatory as of 2015)
- Interfaces: internet or ad hoc networks
- Interconnected in-vehicle systems



UVO eServices – KIA



MBACE2 – Daimler



BMW ConnectedDrive – BMW

* R.N. Charette, "This car runs on code", IEEE spectrum, Feb. 2009





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Context: Cooperative and Interconnected mobility systems

› Cooperative Driving results in*:

- › Less traffic congestion
- › Less traffic accidents
- › Less CO₂ emission




mobility: cooperative driving



safety: collision warning → mitigation → avoidance



comfort: cruise control, advanced cruise control, speed advice



safety: e-call system

*TNO report 2008-D-R0996/A: "Smarter and better – the benefits of intelligent traffic"






Context: Problem statement

Current solutions are insecure, a few examples

- Risks for wireless interfaces*
- Risks for in-vehicle systems**
- Risks for cooperative mobility systems***
- Other threats are coupled nomadic devices



Cooperative mobility systems require security solutions
Absence of security can be a show stopper!


- Information applications with an underlying payment model require secure functioning
- Safety/warning systems require secure and trusted sensor values and communicated information

*S. Checkoway et al. "Comprehensive experimental analyses of automotive attack surfaces", Proceedings of USENIX Security, 2011
** F. Kargl et al. "Secure vehicular communication systems: implementation, performance, and research challenges", IEEE Communications, 2008
*** T. Jeske, "Floating Car Data from Smartphones: What Google and Waze Know About You and How Hackers Can Control Traffic", Black Hat, 2013






Attack incentives



| Incentives | Share for PCs and phones | Likelihood for cooperative systems | Speculated impact on cooperative systems |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|--|
| Profit: premium services | +40% | Serious | Medium |
| Profit: information theft | +28% | Serious | Small |
| Profit: vehicle theft | None | Probable | Medium |
| Destruction or novelty and amusement | +33% | Probable | Large |
| Profit: ransom & click fraud | < 5% | Minor | Medium |
| Eavesdropping and espionage | Unknown | Minor | Small |





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
Mobile internet communication

Problems and solutions

- Always-on data-connections added to vehicles
- Update software
- Real-time routing information
- Web browsing
- Remote vehicle control

Security risk factors

- An internet uplink opens up previously closed systems
- Safety critical system becomes vulnerable
- Potential to harm national security
- Long life cycle poses a challenge that is unrivalled by IT devices








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
Vehicular Ad Hoc Networking

Problems and solutions

- Rapidly changing topology and unorganized nature
- ETSI performed a vulnerability and risk factor analysis in 2010
 - Counter measures and improvements formulated
- Certificate based communication are proposed

Security risk factors

- Data integrity
- Insecure positioning
- Response latency






In-Vehicle Systems

Problems and solutions

- Hardware encryption modules
- Firewalls
- Software upgradeable
- Coupling with nomadic systems

Security risks

- Secure by design
 - Ductile
 - Graceful degradation
 - Coupling of nomadic devices
 - Lack of risk factor analysis





Discussion

Dilemmas

- Data protection vs. information sharing
- Private sector vs. public sector
- Stimulate the economy vs. improve the security

Organizational challenges

- Education in cyber hygiene for maintenance
- OEMs should prepare for massive recalls
- Change of vehicle safety laws
- Backward compatibility between algorithms
- Log behaviour for accountability
- Licence revocation might be needed





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Conclusions

Security for interconnected and cooperative mobility systems will become important in the coming year

- Crucial for acceptance and successful introduction of cooperative mobility systems
- Most serious incentive is profit
- Biggest threat is destruction and novelty
- Biggest security risk factors
 - Application data integrity validation
 - Insecure positioning
 - Systems are currently not secure by design
- Dilemmas and organizational challenges should be addressed



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Questions?

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